In this essay, I focus on two questions. First, what is Kant's understanding of the sense in which our faculties form a unified system? And, second, what are the implications of this for the metaphysical relationships between the faculties within this system? To consider these questions, I begin with a brief discussion of Longuenesse's groundbreaking work on the teleological unity of the understanding as the faculty for judgment. In doing so, I argue for a generalization of Longuenesse's account along two (...) dimensions. The result is a picture of our faculties as forming a teleological system—unified under the overarching aims of reason as the highest rational faculty. Then I discuss the recent debate between “additive” and “transformative” interpretations of the relationship between sensibility and the understand- ing, before proposing that we should interpret Kant as endorsing a moderate form of the “transformative” reading, which captures important elements of both the “additive” and the “transformative” account. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant (...) can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”. (shrink)

This essay develops an interpretation of Kant’s conception of the faculty of reason as the capacity for what he calls "comprehension" (Begreifen). In doing so, it first discusses Kant's characterizations of reason in relation to what he describes as the two highest grades of cognition—insight and comprehension. Then it discusses how the resulting conception of reason relates to more familiar characterizations as the faculty for inference and the faculty of principles. In doing so, it focuses on how the idea of (...) reason as aiming at comprehension expresses the modesty about reason that is essential to Kant’s critical philosophy. It concludes by showing how this grounds an elegant account of the unity of theoretical and practical reason—one that does justice both to the "primacy" that Kant assigns to practical reason and the fact that this "primacy" is grounded in a more basic unity. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a brief (and more than a little potted) history of the concepts of reason, rationality, reasonableness, and reasons in modern European philosophy and consider whether this history might support the "Anscombean" conclusion that, "The concepts of rationality and reasons ought to jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of psychology and philosophy which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it.".

No discussion of academic freedom, research integrity, and patient safety could begin with a more disquieting pair of case studies than those of Nancy Olivieri and David Healy. The cumulative impact of the Olivieri and Healy affairs has caused serious self examination within the biomedical research community. The first part of the essay analyses these recent academic scandals. The two case studies are then placed in their historical context—that context being the transformation of the norms of science through increasingly close (...) ties between research universities and the corporate world. After a literature survey of the ways in which corporate sponsorship has biased the results of clinical drug trials, two different strategies to mitigate this problem are identified and assessed: a regulatory approach, which focuses on managing risks associated with industry funding of university research, and a more radical approach, the sequestration thesis, which counsels the outright elimination of corporate sponsorship. The reformist approach is criticised and the radical approach defended. (shrink)

In reaction to growing critics regarding ecological and ethical aspects of intensive animal husbandry, different initiatives of ethical poultry production try to establish alternative food supply chains on the market. To be able to stabilise these niche innovations parallel to the mainstream regime, new forms of cooperation along the value added chain and with the consumers play an important role. Based on a case study of integrated egg and meat production from a dual-purpose breed by small multifunctional farms in Northeast (...) of Germany, the paper exemplifies the challenges for the different partners of the food supply chain and cooperation management. Empirical data were obtained via nine qualitative interviews with actors along the value chain and via participatory observation of workshops and meetings. The research was embedded in a transdisciplinary project, where different measures to meet the existing challenges were taken and evaluated. Analysing the existing cooperation reveals possibilities for improving cooperation management by e.g. clarifying the goals of the cooperation, including the points of sale as part of the food supply chain and communication of the ethical and sustainability qualities of the product to the consumers. However, the analysis also shows the limits of cooperation in an environment dominated by the paradigm of specialisation, economies of scale and cost reduction, which is also characteristic for parts of the organic sector. The paper discusses if the challenges of establishing this radical niche innovation can be met without a fundamental change of framework conditions as e.g. regulation on animal husbandry. (shrink)

This text examines the distinction and relation between legal philosophy and legal theory in the book Law and Democracy by Jürgen Habermas. To that end, I seek at first to reflect on the concepts of law sociology and philosophy of justice from the dialogue that opposes Habermas to Dworkin and Rawls, on the philosophical basis of equality and distribution. Subsequently, we analyse the arguments about the social integrative function of law that Habermas develops from the works of Parsons and Weber, (...) in order to see what Habermas meant by integrative function of law as well as the contribution of that category for a reconstructive theory of the society. The conclusion points to the link between his philosophy of right to a sociological theory, when, through the concept of communicative reason, he eschews metaphysical discussions of the absolute and seeks to develop a concept of society capable of resisting the dimensions of the life world and system. (shrink)

Este artigo discute o projeto de desenvolvimento presente na constituição da política federalde educação profissional e tecnológica Brasileira inscrita na lei de criação dos InstitutosFederais de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia. A hipótese central era a de que odesenvolvimento regional se tornou a coluna vertebral daquela política pública, que destacoua importância dos arranjos produtivos, sociais e culturais locais no processo de expansão einteriorização da educação profissional. A partir de pesquisa documental sobre os processoslegislativos, o estudo mapeou a construção do projeto de (...) desenvolvimento durante o processode formulação, de tomada de decisão e de implementação da política pública. Com o uso detécnicas associadas à análise de conteúdo e o cruzamento de dados referentes à população dosmunicípios sede dos novos campi, confirmou a hipótese inicial ao reunir evidências sobre oenfoque comunitário e sustentável alinhado ao desenvolvimento regional endógeno inerenteao projeto que deu origem aos Institutos Federais. Concluiu que, por um lado, aintersetorialidade da política driblou a cultura bacharelesca e o desprestígio que a educaçãoprofissional ocupa no país. Também ampliou a capilaridade para os pequenos municípios,sendo que 58,8% dos 483 novos campi foram instalados em localidades com menos de 100mil habitantes. Por outro lado, a cultura organizacional pré-existente e a carência de espaçosinstitucionais de governança resultaram em baixa interação dos campi com o território,estabelecendo um frágil e descontínuo elo com o desenvolvimento regional. (shrink)

Contemporary forms of Kantian constitutivism generally begin with a conception of agency on which the constitutive aim of agency is some form of autonomy or self-unification. This chapter argues for a re-orientation of the Kantian constitutivist project towards views that begin with a conception of rationality on which both theoretical and practical rationality aim at forms of understanding. In a slogan, then, understanding-first as opposed to autonomy-first constitutivism. Such a view gives the constitutivist new resources for explaining many classes of (...) reasons, while also offering a new way of understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason. The chapter concludes by arguing that the resulting view is best understood, not so much as an alternative to autonomy-first constitutivism, but as a complement to it. (shrink)

Schafer contends that we suffer from an overabundance of acoustic information, and explores ways to restore our ability to hear the nuances of sounds around us.

In this article I offer an opinionated overview of the central elements of Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. I begin with a brief characterization of how Kant conceives of the aims of human inquiry – focusing on the idea that inquiry ideally aims at not just cognition (Erkenntnis), but also the more demanding cognitive achievements that Kant labels insight (Einsehen) and comprehension (Begreifen). Then I explore the implications of this picture for philosophy — emphasizing Kant’s distinction between critical (...) and doctrinal phases of philosophical inquiry, with the first of these playing both a negative and a positive role with respect to the second. Then, I will argue that this positive role is possible, according to Kant, only insofar as philosophy follows what I call a “capacities-first” methodology – that is, one that treats basic cognitive capacities (such as reason) and their self-conscious activities as fundamental (in both a cognitive sense and in an explanatory sense) for the sort of philosophy human beings are capable of. It is this methodology, I will argue, that allows Kant to introduce the first principles that philosophy in its doctrinal phase requires in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor (at least obviously) incompatible with Kant’s own critical restrictions on cognition. I conclude by discussing some of the implications of this methodological picture – including the methodological significance of self-consciousness and regressive or “transcendental” arguments, Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic methods in philosophy, and Kant’s conception of reason as autonomous. (shrink)

A presença de Kant e possível influência na filosofia de Nietzsche é motivo de muita controvérsia. Se em seus primeiros escritos Nietzsche é claramente influenciado por Kant, os textos do período maduro não deixam perceber com clareza o teor do diálogo que neles se estabelece, uma vez que Nietzsche assume uma postura radical contra Kant. Essa postura esconde justamente que, em meio aos rompimentos diante do idealismo transcendental, Nietzsche permanece devedor de Kant. Um aspecto dessa dívida é a noção de (...) ficção regulativa. Pretendemos, assim, mostrar, primeiramente, que a concepção de Nietzsche de que a falsidade de um juízo não constitui uma objeção contra ele é um traço decisivo de seu pensamento antidogmático e, em seguida, defender que esse antidogmatismo tem ascendência na concepção de Kant de princípios regulativos. The presence of Kant and its possible influence in Nietzsche's philosophy is a controversial issue. If in his early writings Nietzsche is clearly influenced by Kant, his mature period texts no longer allow anyone to see clearly the content of the dialog established therein, once Nietzsche assumes a radical view against Kant. This view hides that, regardless the disruptions done in face of the transcendental Idealism, Nietzsche remains debtor to Kant. An aspect of this debt is the notion of regulative fiction. We intend, thus, to show: first, that Nietzsche's conception that the falsity of a judgment does not constitute an objection to itself is a decisive trace of his anti-dogmatic thought and, secondly, to argue that this anti-dogmatism has ascendancy in Kant's conception of regulative principles. (shrink)

In recent years, several philosophers - including Joshua Gert, Douglas Portmore, and Elizabeth Harman - have argued that there is a sense in which morality itself does not treat moral reasons as consistently overriding.2 My aim in the present essay is to develop and extend this idea from a somewhat different perspective. In doing so, I offer an alternative way of formalizing the idea that morality is modest about the weight of moral reasons in this way, thereby making more explicit (...) the connections between this thesis and similar issues in the epistemic sphere. In addition, I discuss how these ideas can transform our thinking about familiar questions in ethics such as the nature of self-effacement, the significance of reflective endorsement, the weight that moral reasons ought to be given in all things consideration, and the plausibility of “indirect” moral theories. Finally, I show that these ideas are compatible even with pictures of morality – such as Kant’s – on which morality might seem to anything but modest about its own importance. In doing so, I stress that it is possible to see morality as modest about the weight of specifically moral reasons, while also seeing all practical reasons as grounded in morality more indirectly – namely, by seeing morality as determining the weight that both moral and non-moral considerations deserve to have in all things considered deliberation. (shrink)

Tendo como ponto de partida a obra de René Girard, o presente artigo pretende apresentar a dimensão antropológica presente na obra deste autor, destacando a sua originalidade e novidade ao pensar o homem como animal socialmente desejante. A teoria mimética, como Girard a formula, pretende ser uma teoria que, colocando no centro da sua reflexão o desejo e a imitação, permita compreender como se estruturam as sociedades arcaicas e actuais, partindo de mecanismos marcadamente antropológicos, para afirmar que as sociedades se (...) estruturam a partir do desejo, do sacrifício e da necessidade de existência de «bodes expiatórios». A partir deste pressuposto, o sacrifício é a primeira instituição humana, com a capacidade farmacológica de preservar a sociedade e de permitir a sua subsistência no tempo. A cultura, por seu lado, emerge a partir do desejo mimético; e o mecanismo do bode expiatório, mecanismo vitimário por excelência, regula a sociedade ao solucionar as suas tensões internas. Considerando estes três conceitos – sacrifício, desejo mimético e mecanismo do bode expiatório – este artigo expõe o modo como se relacionam estes conceitos. Apesar de constatar a sua presença e eficácia na história, Girard não os legitima de jure, desvelando o segredo da sua eficácia – a ignorância inocente das vítimas – que, paradoxalmente, persiste mesmo depois de denunciada nas suas escusas razões. Posto isto, perguntemo-nos: como proteger o homem da sua própria violência? (shrink)

RESUMO: O presente artigo pretende problematizar, preliminarmente, o "problema antropológico" segundo a arqueologia de Michel Foucault. Partindo de teses populares da Psicologia, em particular, e das ciências humanas, em geral, sobre o "Homem", este texto primeiramente correlaciona essas teses com as problemáticas dos textos foucaultianos dos anos 1950, a Introdução a Sonho e Existência e Maladie Mentale et Personnalité, para então mostrar como os textos "arqueológicos" do autor se configuram como respostas iniciais às questões dos textos de 1954, já começando (...) pelos textos publicados em 1957. Os exemplares privilegiados são História da Loucura e As Palavras e as Coisas: após circunscrever aspectos singulares de cada argumentação, o artigo pretende explorar em que sentido os textos se reúnem sob a questão mais geral de uma crítica arqueológica à questão antropológica dos "saberes" modernos. //////////////// ABSTRACT: This article aims to discuss, on a preliminary basis, the "anthropological question" in the context of Michel Foucault's "archeological" texts. The paper starts with some popular assertions and postulates regarding "man" in the human sciences, based on historical examples in the history of psychology. Secondly, the article correlates these postulates with Foucauldian texts published in the 1950s, each one providing a singular project for an anthropological view. Finally, it is shown how the "archaeological" texts can be read as initial responses to the questions formulated in 1954 and 1957. The analysis concentrates on Madness and Civilization and The Order of Things, exploring the differences of each argument and discussing how each book contemplates the general question of an archaeological criticism of the anthropological problem. (shrink)

With respect to the topic of “powers and abilities,” most readers will associate David Hume with his multi-pronged critique of traditional attempts to make robust explanatory use of those notions in a philosophical or scientific context. But Hume’s own philosophy is also structured around the attribution to human beings of a variety of basic faculties or mental powers – such as the reason and the imagination, or the various powers involved in Hume’s account of im- pressions of reflection and the (...) passions. Indeed, there is a clear case to be made that, despite his deflationary account of our concept of power, Hume continues to treat certain basic powers or faculties as forming the explanatory bedrock for his new “science of man”. In this essay, I will discuss how this apparent conflict between the “critical” (if not outright skeptical) and “constructive” aspects of Hume’s discussion of powers and abilities is best resolved – with special attention to the question of how this illuminates Hume’s place in the development of early modern conceptions of the proper method for philosophy. (shrink)

In this essay, I develop and defend a virtue‐theoretic conception of rationality as a capacity whose function is understanding, as opposed to mere truth or correctness. I focus on two main potential advantages of this view. First, its ability to explain the rationality of forms of explanatory reasoning, and second, its ability to offer a more unified account of theoretical and practical rationality.

Manifest reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant’s transcendental idealism. So there is a great deal in Allais’s discussion to celebrate. But I want to focus here on two aspects of her views that I am not yet sure about: First, Allais’s understanding of the relationship between concepts and intuitions. And second, her characterization of the manner in which intuitions are object-dependent. I’ll close by making some general remarks about the significance of this (...) for Allais’s understanding of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

Kant's Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant’s conception of reason and its philosophical significance, focusing on two claims. First, it argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or “comprehension”). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and practical rationality, without reducing either to the other. In particular, through it, we see why the (...) activities of both theoretical and practical reason are governed by a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, while also seeing why reason is essentially autonomous. At the same time, Kant's Reason also reads Kant as presenting us with a compelling picture of the role that reason (as a capacity or power) should play in a systematic approach to foundational philosophical questions. In doing so, it argues for an account of the fundamental norms that apply to rational beings that treats as fundamental neither substantive reasons or values nor merely structural rationality, but instead a robust conception of reason as a power or capacity — namely, the capacity for theoretical and practical understanding. The result is a form of “rational constitutivism” – one which contrasts both with the forms of “reasons fundamentalism” that are currently fashionable and the forms of “agency-first constitutivism” that have dominated much of Kantian metaethics. In this sense, the aim of the book is to vindicate Kant’s insistence that his philosophy represents nothing more or less than reason’s implicit self-understanding coming to explicit and systematic self-consciousness. (shrink)

In this essay, I will outline a novel strategy for using constitutivist ideas from Kantian metaethics to critique social practices and institutions. In doing so, I do not mean to defend this model of critique as the only viable form of social and political critique, even within a Kantian framework – nor, indeed, as always the most appropriate. But I hope to show that it provides us with a form of critique that allows us to (i) develop a robust critique (...) of many social practices (ii) on both epistemic and practical grounds, while nonetheless (iii) beginning from a perspective that is, in some sense, internal – or better, immanent – to the practice in question. Thus, if we are looking for a form of social critique that is neither purely epistemic nor merely external – which, in other words, allows us to critique social practices on something like their own terms as practically irrational – this method should be attractive for philosophers with Kantian (or post-Kantian) sympathies. At the heart of this conception of critique lies in the idea that social practices may be thought of as attempts at (some form of) collective practical understanding. As I will explain more below, this way of thinking about the rationality of social practices may be seen as the product of applying a general (post-Kantian) model of rationality, which I have developed elsewhere, to the rationality of social collectives or practices. (shrink)

Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational is a beautiful presentation of how one might defend a reasons-first approach to rationality. I’m going to focus these comments on some of the larger systematic ambitions of the book. In doing so, my hope is to draw Lord out concerning the larger project of which the book is a part and to raise some more general questions about the project of defining rationality in terms of reasons. In doing so, my focus with (...) be on the relationship between the reasons-first program and a more traditional view, which we might call the reason-first program. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘ faultless disagreement ’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspectives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement present (...) in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible than most philosophers believe today. (shrink)

A recent study by Olivieri et al, published in PLOS ONE, reports that between 2009 and 2015 a third of patients with thalassaemia in Canada’s largest hospital were switched from first-line licensed drugs to regimens of deferiprone, an unlicensed drug of unproven safety and efficacy. Based on retrospective data from patient records, the PLOS Study reports that patients treated with deferiprone, either as monotherapy or in combination with first-line drugs, suffered serious adverse effects. The data reported by Olivieri et al (...) give rise to a number of ethical issues. These ethical issues are identified, placed in historical context and analysed. For purposes of this analysis, reliance is placed on two core principles of research ethics, harm minimisation and informed consent, and also on the hospital’s mission statement. Then a mystery is explored: How and why did it happen that Toronto’s University Health Network treated large numbers of patients with an unlicensed drug over a period of many years? ‘Institutional conflict of interest’ is considered as a possible explanatory hypothesis. (shrink)

In this essay, I propose a novel way of thinking about Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. According to this interpretation, the critical Kant can generally be understood as operating within a “capacities‐first” philosophical framework – that is, within a framework in which our basic rational or cognitive capacities play both an explanatorily and epistemically fundamental role in philosophy – or, at least, in the sort of philosophy that limited creatures like us are capable of. In discussing this idea, (...) I consider the complicated relationship between the explanatory and epistemic roles that such capacities play in Kant. I also sketch how this way of thinking about Kant’s methodology can illuminate the foundations of both his theoretical and his practical philosophy, before discussing some of Kant’s reasons for finding this approach to philosophy attractive. I close with a brief discussion of the contemporary relevance of this approach. (shrink)

A presente pesquisa apresenta uma investigação acerca do desenvolvimento da ideia de justiça de Platão em dois de seus diálogos: A República e As Leis. O texto aborda a essência da proposta de justiça em ambos os diálogos, considerando, também, o projeto político defendido por Platão, desde a cidade ideal da República até a cidade possível das Leis, ocorrendo a mesma situação com a ideia de justiça. Para analisar a referida temática, o caminho escolhido na presente pesquisa expõe duas seções, (...) sendo que a primeira seção analisa a essência da justiça na República e a segunda seção trabalha a essência da justiça nas Leis. Ao final, a pesquisa conclui, de forma geral, que, na República, Platão não fez muitas previsões quanto à necessidade de leis postas pelo Estado, aproximando- se de um conceito jusnaturalista, enquanto que, em As Leis, já há uma defesa maior da necessidade da legislação como uma forma ou meio de equilibrar o conflito humano. (shrink)

RESUMO: Bergson e Einstein participaram de uma conferência no Collège de France, em Paris, no mês de abril de 1922. Muitos desencontros entre o físico e o filósofo, no que diz respeito à questão do tempo, são já superados, se considerarmos a existência de processos dinâmicos instáveis, mas ainda permanece atual a questão da interioridade do tempo à ciência e, portanto, a possibilidade de retomada da complementaridade entre a ciência e a metafísica, proposta por Bergson, como necessária para a compreensão (...) da complexidade dos problemas contemporâneos. A partir das concepções de intuição em Bergson e Einstein, este artigo explora as dificuldades e as potências do diálogo entre a Física e a Filosofia. ABSTRACT: Bergson and Einstein attended the conference held in Paris at the Collège de France in April 1922. Many disagreements between the physicist and the philosopher with regard to the question of time are overcome if we consider the existence of unstable dynamic processes. However, the question of interiority of time in science still remains, and therefore also the possibility of a resumption of the complementarity between science and metaphysics - something Bergson proposed as necessary for understanding the complexity of contemporary problems. Based on the concepts of intuition in Bergson and Einstein, this article explores the difficulties of, and the potentials for, the dialogue between physics and philosophy. (shrink)

Por meio de uma análise reconstrutiva da filosofia político-jurídica de Jürgen Habermas e de Rainer Forst, bem como com auxílio de literatura secundária, são analisados os conceitos de direitos culturais e tolerância. O objetivo da presente pesquisa é visualizar como Habermas e Forst desenvolvem os referidos conceitos. Para este fim, o artigo é dividido em duas seções, a partir de uma justificativa introdutória da investigação dos objetivos traçados. A primeira seção trata da questão que envolve os direitos culturais, seu significado, (...) evolução e maneira de efetivar sua garantia. A segunda seção aborda o conceito de tolerância, que Habermas trabalha enquanto necessidade procedimental a partir de direitos subjetivos a iguais liberdades de ação, enquanto Forst o trabalha a partir de uma concepção como respeito ao outro, em que será essencial o princípio de justificação da justiça, amparado no uso público da razão. Ao final, as últimas considerações apontam para o fato de que Habermas mantém seu edifício teórico da década de 1990, trabalhando a possibilidade de tolerância e a garantia de direitos culturais a partir de procedimentos democráticos e de justiça política, nos quais normas e leis devem ser racionalmente aceitas em uma cultura política compartilhada. Já Forst busca um rumo prático-normativo, em que a razão prática requer pessoas razoáveis e autônomas moralmente, trabalhando a necessidade de justificação por via procedimental. (shrink)

A presente pesquisa analisa a reformulação da categoria da reificação pela teoria crítica. Basendo-se nas análises do filósofo alemão Axel Honneth e da filósofa norte-americana Nancy Fraser, defende-se a tese de que Honneth foi melhor sucedido na tarefa de atualização do conceito, enquanto que Fraser utiliza a ideia de reificação muito próxima a defendida por Honneth. O trabalho reconstrói, inicialmente, a percepção de reificação presente na filosofia de Georg Lukács. No segundo momento, investiga a proposta de reformulação operada por Honneth. (...) Em terceiro instante, trabalha a concepção do comportamento reificador na teoria de Fraser. No quarto passo, analisa algumas críticas opostas à reformulação de Honneth. Por fim, conclui positivamente quanto à reformulação apresentada por Honneth, bem como defende que a utilização do conceito realizada por Fraser está próxima ao entendimento honnethiano, mas com alguma diferença conceitual. Palavras-chave: reificação; reconhecimento; marxismo; status. (shrink)

Depois de breve contextualização, este texto estuda a herança da psicologia experimental de Christian Wolff em Karl Philipp Moritz, Immanuel Kant e Søren Kierkegaard. Esses três autores transformaram as premissas mais científicas e técnicas da disciplina em formas mais abertas de experimentação romanesca ou teatral.

Several problems with Hegel’s conception of the organism in the Encyclopaedia are due to the separation between individual life in Nature and the universal life of the Concept. This discontinuity between ontogenesis and phylogenesis in his dialectics of organic life will be studied here by following his presentation of physiological development, especially reproduction, and by reconstructing the historical model he criticizes—Leibniz’s organic machines and their development in Buffon’s Natural History—a model that was also of crucial importance to the philosophy of (...) nature of Schelling and his followers. (shrink)

I consider sophisticated forms of relativism and their effectiveness at responding to the skeptical argument from moral disagreement. In order to do so, I argue that the relativist must do justice to our intuitions about the depth of moral disagreement, while also explaining why it can be rational to be relatively insensitive to such disagreements. I argue that the relativist can provide an account with these features, at least in some form, but that there remain serious questions about the viability (...) of the resulting account. (shrink)

Discusses how to develop the idea that the normative truth is perspective-dependent with a broadly constructivist approach to metaethics - arguing in favor of developing this idea in terms of the idea that the normative truth is dependent upon the perspective of the assessor.

Metaethical constructivism is one of the main movements within contemporary metaethics – especially among those with Kantian inclinations. But both the philosophical coherence and the Kantian pedigree of constructivism are hotly contested. In the first half of this article, I first explore the sense in which Kant's own views might be described as constructivist and then use the resulting understanding as a guide to how we might think about Kantian constructivism today. Along the way, I hope to suggest that a (...) fairly diverse range of views within contemporary metaethics – including some without any explicit allegiance to Kant – may be thought of as pursuing a version of the resulting strategy. (shrink)

In this paper, I’ll sketch an approach to epistemology that draws its inspiration from two aspects of Kant’s philosophical project. In particular, I want to explore how we might develop a Kantian conception of rationality that combines a virtue-theoretical perspective on the nature of rationality with a role for transcendental arguments in defining the demands this conception of rationality places upon us as thinkers. In discussing these connections, I’ll proceed as follows. First, I’ll describe the sorts of epistemological questions I’ll (...) be focusing on, and the framework within which I’ll try to address them. Then I’ll say a bit about the connections between this framework on Kant’s own views. Next, I’ll explain in more detail how the two main elements of this framework relate to one another by explaining how a certain sort of “transcendental argument” allows us to derive conclusions about the requirements of rationality from facts about the nature of rational capacities. Then, I’ll briefly illustrate these connections with two examples: the rationality of explanatory inference like inference to the best explanation and the rationality of perceptual belief. Finally, I’ll conclude by saying a bit about the relevance of this ideas for debates about the rationality of basic beliefs or prior probabilities. (shrink)